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ABSTRACT
Secure and Energy-Efficient Processors
by
Shengshuo Lu
Chair: Marios C. Papaefthymiou, Zhengya Zhang
Security has become an essential part of digital information storage and pro-
cessing. Both high-end and low-end applications, such as data centers and In-
ternet of Things (IoT), rely on robust security to ensure proper operation. En-
cryption of information is the primary means for enabling security. Among all
encryption standards, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a widely adopted
cryptographic algorithm, due to its simplicity and high security.
Although encryption standards in general are extremely difficult to break math-
ematically, they are vulnerable to so-called side channel attacks, which exploit elec-
trical signatures of operating chips, such as power trace or magnetic field radiation,
to crack the encryption. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is a representa-
tive and powerful side-channel attack method, which has demonstrated high ef-
fectiveness in cracking secure chips.
This dissertation explores circuits and architectures that offer protection against
DPA attacks in high-performance security applications and in low-end IoT appli-
cations. The effectiveness of the proposed technologies is evaluated. First, a 128-
bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core for high-performance security ap-
plications is designed, fabricated and evaluated in a 65nm CMOS technology. A
xii
novel charge-recovery logic family, called Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), is introduced
in this design to achieve switching-independent energy dissipation and provide
intrinsic high resistance against DPA attacks. Based on measurements, the AES
core achieves a throughput of 16.90Gbps and power consumption of 98mW, ex-
hibiting 720× higher DPA resistance and 30% lower power than a conventional
CMOS counterpart implemented on the same die and operated at the same clock
frequency.
Second, an AES core designed for low-cost and energy-efficient IoT security
applications is designed and fabricated in a 65nm CMOS technology. A novel
Dual-Rail Flush Logic (DRFL) with switching-independent power profile is used
to yield intrinsic resistance against DPA attacks with minimum area and energy
consumption. Measurement results show that this 0.048mm2 core achieves energy
consumption as low as 1.25pJ/bit, while providing at least 2604× higher DPA re-
sistance over its conventional CMOS counterpart on the same die, marking the
smallest, most energy-efficient and most secure full-datapath AES core published
to date.
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Security is a critically important consideration nowadays, especially in the areas of
communications and storage, as well as emerging domains such as big data [6] and
IoT [7]. Data is typically encrypted during transmission or when in storage. Since
encryption is so frequently used, and the volume of information to be communi-
cated or stored keeps increasing, dedicated hardware is the preferred choice for
implementing encryption with high performance and power efficiency. Dedicated
hardware is more efficient than software solutions, because encryption algorithms
typically require nonlinear transformations, which can be efficiently accelerated in
hardware. Moreover, it delivers higher performance than a software implemen-
tation, a critical concern for high-bandwidth storage and communication applica-
tions. Tailored to the specific encryption computation, dedicated hardware, i.e., an
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), achieves both high performance and
high efficiency. Moreover, power consumption can be further reduced in an ASIC
using effective hardware techniques, including clock gating and power gating.
The continued increase of data bandwidth continues to drive the need for higher
energy efficiency. In high-end applications, where performance is the first pri-
ority, performance can be limited by a variety of factors such as thermal bud-
get [8]. Therefore, energy-efficient solutions are necessary for achieving higher
performance.
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In low-end applications, such as IoT devices, performance is not a critical re-
quirement. However, these devices typically rely on limited energy sources such
as batteries [9], in some cases, even harvest energy from the environment such as
solar power [10, 11]. For IoT applications, the energy efficiency is a critical design
consideration.
In applications where security is a top priority, energy efficiency cannot come
at the cost of security. In practice, when implemented in hardware, secure is often
not really ”secure”. Although modern advanced encryption codes are unbreakable
mathematically in reasonable amounts of time, when implemented in hardware,
they are vulnerable to side channel attacks, which take advantage of the side-
channel information leaked from the hardware to break the encryption key [12].
For example, Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack is one of the most effective
attacks [13, 14]. Essentially, DPA attacks take advantage of the power profile of
a circuit’s switching behavior as side channel information. This information can
be obtained by attackers from the power profile via simply monitoring the power
supply current. After applying statistical analysis on this information, the encryp-
tion key inside the chip can be infered with relatively high confidence.
Considering the fact that DPA is very effective and can break encryption keys
within seconds, the secure processor designs in this dissertation focus on improv-
ing resistance to DPA attacks. Various circuit techniques are proposed and investi-
gated to protect against DPA attacks.
In this dissertation, two design approaches are proposed and investigated, aimed
at high-end and low-end application, respectively. The high-end solution relies on
charge-recovery logic, which has superior potential to provide DPA intrinsic DPA
resistance and high energy efficiency. Due to its dual-rail nature, charge-recovery
logic has superior potential to provide intrinsic DPA resistance and high energy
efficiency. In this thesis, we propose Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), a charge-recovery
2
logic with a balanced topology and enhanced DPA resistance that is capable of op-
erating at GHz clock rates. The potential of BBL is assessed through the design
and evaluation of an AES test chip. Our experimental evaluation shows that the
BBL-based AES test-chip achieves GHz-level operating speed and offers over 720x
higher DPA resistance than its CMOS counterpart implemented on the same die
and with identical architecture.
For low-end applications, we propose Dual Rail Flush Logic (DRFL), a dual-rail
static logic that relies on a novel pipeline flushing mechanism to achieve balanced
energy consumption and enhanced DPA resistance. Due to its CMOS underpin-
nings, DRFL is voltage scalable, resulting in chips with superior energy efficiency.
We have designed and evaluated a DRFL-based AES test-chip which consumes
1.25pJ/b and over 2,600x higher DPA resistance compared to its CMOS counter-
part on the same die.
The remainder of this dissertation has four chapters.
Chapter 2 provides background information about the AES algorithm and ar-
chitecture, DPA attacks, and existing solutions against DPA attacks. Chapter 3
presents the proposed AES solution for high throughput applications. This chap-
ter provides background on the principles of charge recovery circuitry. It also gives
a comprehensive explanation/description of our DPA attack setup. Chapter 4 fo-
cuses on the proposed AES solution for low-end IoT applications. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses the directions for future work and concludes this dissertation.
3
CHAPTER 2
Background
This chapter provides background on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
It also gives background on side channel attacks, focusing on Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) attack. A variety of methods protecting against DPA attacks are
also introduced.
2.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the most widely used symmetric cryptog-
raphy method. A shared private key is applied on a packet-by-packet basis to en-
crypt (or decrypt) a plaintext (or ciphertext) message. Data encryption and decryp-
tion are packet based operations, which implies that AES implementation needs to
match the physical data rate. This indicates the high performance requirement
of AES in high throughput applications. AES has been adopted widely in many
standards including both high throughput protocols such as IEEE 802.11 Wireless
Networking [15], high-speed serial link, etc, as well as various low throughput
protocols in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain such as Bluetooth [16], ANT [17]
and IEEE 802.15.4 [18].
The underlying mathematics of AES are performed in the binary Galois field [19].
The mathematics of Galois fields are discussed in the next subsection, followed by
4
Table 2.1: Addition and multiplication in GF(2)
+ 0 1 × 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1
a detailed explanation of AES datapath architecture.
2.1.1 Galois Field Arithmetic
A Galois field, also referred to as finite field, is a field in which the number of ele-
ments is finite. As in other fields, a Galois field is a set on which several basic op-
erations including addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, are defined
and follow certain rules. This dissertation restricts the discussion on implement-
ing applications in the binary Galois field–GF(2n). Each GF(2n) has 2n elements
and is associated with a primitive polynomial [20, 21]. The primitive polynomial
is irreducible, i.e., it cannot be further factored into the product of two polyno-
mials. Multiplication and multiplicative inverse are defined over the irreducible
polynomial, as shown in the examples in Section 2.1.1.2. GF(2n) is an extension
field of GF(2) [21]. The implementation of GF(2n) arithmetics is based on GF(2)
implementation. Addition and multiplication in GF(2) are defined in Table 2.1. An
addition in GF(2) can be realized by an exclusive-OR gate, and multiplication can
be realized by an AND gate. Subtraction in GF(2) is identical to addition because
x + x = 0→ x = −x, ∀x ∈ GF(2).
In a binary system, a n-bit number A is represented by Equation (2.1).
A =
n−1
∑
k=0
ak2k , ak ∈ {0, 1} (2.1)
In this dissertation, A will also be written as {an−1, an−2, ..., a1, a0}.
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2.1.1.1 Addition and Subtraction
Let A = {an−1, an−2, ..., a1, a0}, and B = {bn−1, bn−2, ..., b1, b0}. Let C = {cn−1, cn−2, ..., c1, c0}
be the addition (or subtraction) result of A and B. An addition C = A+ B in Galois
field GF(2n) is defined by Equation (2.2).
ck = ak + bk(mod 2), k = {0, 1, ..., n− 1} (2.2)
Similarly, the difference A− B is defined by Equation (2.3).
ck = ak − bk(mod 2), k = {0, 1, ..., n− 1} (2.3)
Since addition and subtraction in GF(2) are identical, they are also identical
in binary extension Galois field GF(2n) and can be implemented using bitwise
exclusive-OR.
2.1.1.2 Multiplication and Multiplicative Inverse
Multiplication requires additional steps compared to conventional integer arith-
metic. Similar to previous section, let A = {an−1, an−2, ..., a1, a0}, and
B = {bn−1, bn−2, ..., b1, b0}. Moreover, let C = {cn−1, cn−2, ..., c1, c0} be the result of
multiplication A× B. Let P = {pn, pn−1, pn−2, ..., p1, p0} be an irreducible polyno-
mial in GF(2n) with pn = 1, p0 = 1, and pk ∈ {0, 1}, for k = n− 1, ..., 1. Multipli-
cation is defined by Equation (2.4).
C = A× B(mod P) (2.4)
Multiplication in Galois fields requires both polynomial multiplication and mod-
ulo operation. The modulo operation guarantees that the product C will still be
in GF(2n) (i.e., the degree of C < n). For example, in GF(24) with irreducible
6
Figure 2.1: Illustration of polynomial modulo.
polynomial P = {10011}, A = {1010}bin = 10dec and B = {1100}bin = 12dec, the
polynomial multiplication of A and B is shown in Equation (2.5).
(23 + 22)× (23 + 21) = 26 + 24 + 25 + 23 = {1111000} (2.5)
polynomial modulo operation is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The product C = 1010× 1100(mod 10011) in GF(24) equals 0001bin = 1dec. Let
A′ be the multiplicative inverse of A that satisfies Equation (2.6).
A× A′(mod P) = 1 (2.6)
Therefore, since their product is 1, the elements {1010} and {1100} are multiplica-
tive inverses of one another in GF(24) with irreducible polynomial {10011}.
The multiplicative inverse operation is quite complicated involving polynomial
division. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) and the Itoh-Tsujii Algorithm
(ITA) are typically used to compute multiplicative inverses directly in GF(28). In a
small Galois field, the multiplicative inverse can also be implemented via lookup
table, which requires 2n n-bit entries to store the entire set of results for GF(2n).
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2.1.1.3 Composite Field
The complexity of implementing field operations varies a lot depending on the
representation of the field elements [22], although two Galois fields with iden-
tical degree are isomorphic. A composite field is typically employed to reduce
hardware complexity of multiplication/multiplicative inverse in large Galois field
GF(2n), i.e., when n is a large number [22, 23].
GF(28) is used as example field since AES is implemented on GF(28). As men-
tioned earlier, GF(28) can be interpreted as the extension field of binary GF(2).
Similarly, GF(28) can also be represented as composite field GF((24)2). An ele-
ment in GF((24)2) can be represented as shx + sl, where sh, sl ∈ GF(24), and x is
the root of construction polynomial P2(x) = x2 + x + λ, where λ ∈ GF(24) and
P2(x) is irreducible over GF(24) [24].
2.1.2 AES Algorithm and Architecture
The AES cryptography is a block cipher, which operates on 128-bit data blocks [25].
AES defines a set of possible key lengths—128/192/256 bits—which results in ei-
ther 10, 12, or 14 iterative rounds, respectively. Each round of the encryption pro-
cedure has several kernels: AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRow, MixColumn, as
shown in the left column of Fig. 2.2. The decryption process, as shown in the right
column of Fig. 2.2, consists of a similar set of kernels but in reverse order. AES is a
symmetric cryptography algorithm, which means the same key is utilized in both
encryption and decryption processes. The shared secret key, which is pre-known
to both encryption and decryption processes, is used to generate N subkeys in a
key expansion process. Encryption and decryption have the same key expansion
procedure, so the same set of subkeys is used in both procedures. However, sub-
keys are used in a reverse order in decryption process.
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Figure 2.2: Encryption (Left) and Decryption (Right) Datapath of AES. AES is a
symmetric key cryptography algorithm that uses the same subkeys for encryption
and decryption process in reverse order.
The 128 bits of a block are operated on as a 4-by-4 matrix of bytes. This byte
matrix is referred to as state. The arithmetic of AES is over binary Galois field
GF(28) with irreducible polynomial 28 + 24 + 23 + 21 + 1. Let S denote the state,
i.e., the 4-by-4 byte matrix in Equation (2.7), where each byte of the state, s(i, j), 0 ≤
i, j ≤ 3, is an element in GF(28).
S =

s(0, 0) s(0, 1) s(0, 2) s(0, 3)
s(1, 0) s(1, 1) s(1, 2) s(1, 3)
s(2, 0) s(2, 1) s(2, 2) s(2, 3)
s(3, 0) s(3, 1) s(3, 2) s(3, 3)

(2.7)
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2.1.2.1 AddRoundKey
AddRoundKey is a step that combines the state with subkey in each round. The
output of AddRoundKey depends on the key specified by the user and shared
with the trusted entities. The subkey is also 4-by-4 byte matrix (i.e., the same size
of state), which is derived from the key expansion process. The operation in Ad-
dRoundKey is Galois field addition, which is exactly binary bitwise exclusive-OR.
2.1.2.2 SubBytes
SubBytes is a non-linear transformation step, in which each byte of the state is
substituted with another byte. It consists of two steps: SBox and the linear affine
processing. There are two major methods to implement the SubBytes kernel. The
first method is realized by a lookup table. The lookup table contains all 256 pos-
sible bytes. The state byte s(i, j) is split up to two 4-bit numbers—row index and
column index respectively—to look up the corresponding byte. This method is
easy to implement but it requires memory to store the table. Moreover, the inverse
SubBytes operation in the decryption process will require a different look up table.
Another method to implement the SubBytes kernel is to perform Galois field
arithmetic directly. The SubBytes kernel is further decomposed into two steps:
SBox and affine transformation, as shown in Fig 2.3.(a). SBox is a Galois field
multiplicative inverse and the linear affine processing can be realized by a matrix-
vector operation in binary Galois field GF(2).
Galois field Multiplicative Inverse. There are many methods to implement
a Galois field multiplicative inverse, as discussed in Section 2.1.1.2. In the core
implemented in Chapter 4, multiplicative inverse is performed on composite field,
resulting in a dramatic area reduction compared to the traditional lookup table
implementation in Chapter 3.
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1.3, an element in GF(28), i.e. a byte S of AES
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Figure 2.3: (a) Compute SubByte in native Galois field. (b) Compute GF(28) mul-
tiplicative inverse in composite field GF((24)2).
state, can be expressed as shx + sl in composite field GF((24)2). The multiplicative
inverse of shx + sl modulo P2(x) is given by Equation (2.8), and λ ∈ GF(24) is a
constant.
(shx + sl)−1 = shθ−1 + (sh + sl)θ−1 (2.8)
θ = λsh2 + sl(sh + sl)
The datapath to implement GF(28) multiplicative inverse in composite field
GF((24)2) is illustrated in Fig. 2.3 (b).
Affine Transformation. The affine transformation is performed as matrix-vector
transformation in binary Galois field. Thus all the multiplications and additions
are conducted in GF(2), following the rules in Table 2.1. The affine transformation
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is specified in Equation (2.9).
As(i, j) +~b =

1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1


s(i, j)0
s(i, j)1
s(i, j)2
s(i, j)3
s(i, j)4
s(i, j)5
s(i, j)6
s(i, j)7

+

1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0

(2.9)
A is an 8-bit by 8-bit matrix, and ~b is an 8-bit vector with elements s(i, j) =
{s(i, j)0, ..., s(i, j)7}, where s(i, j) is one byte in state matrix S. This process can be
computed in parallel for all 16 bytes s(i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 3. The affine transformation
is invertible, so the invSubByte kernel of decryption datapath can also be realized
in the same way with a different affine pair—8-bit by 8-bit matrix Adec and 8-bit
vector~bdec as Equation (2.10).
Adecsdec(i, j) +~bdec =

0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0


sdec(i, j)0
sdec(i, j)1
sdec(i, j)2
sdec(i, j)3
sdec(i, j)4
sdec(i, j)5
sdec(i, j)6
sdec(i, j)7

+

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

(2.10)
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2.1.2.3 ShiftRow
Row permutation is performed in this step: the first row of state matrix S remains
the same; the second row is circular shifted to the left by one byte; the third row is
circular shifted by two bytes, and the last row is circular shifted by three bytes. Let
Sin in Equation (2.11) be the 16-byte state matrix input to ShiftRow.
Sin =

s(0, 0) s(0, 1) s(0, 2) s(0, 3)
s(1, 0) s(1, 1) s(1, 2) s(1, 3)
s(2, 0) s(2, 1) s(2, 2) s(2, 3)
s(3, 0) s(3, 1) s(3, 2) s(3, 3)

(2.11)
The output of ShiftRow—Sout—is given by Equation (2.12).
Sout =

s(0, 0) s(0, 1) s(0, 2) s(0, 3)
s(1, 1) s(1, 2) s(1, 3) s(1, 0)
s(2, 2) s(2, 3) s(2, 0) s(2, 1)
s(3, 3) s(3, 0) s(3, 1) s(3, 2)

(2.12)
The ShiftRow operation scrambles the data in order to prevent the columns of the
state from being linearly dependent. This operation can be inverted in a straight-
forward manner.
2.1.2.4 MixColumn
After scrambling along the row, column wise transformation is performed. In this
operation, a new column of the state is generated by matrix-vector multiplication
in Galois field between a fixed matrix and the previous column vector of state ma-
trix. Let [s(0, j)in, s(1, j)in, s(2, j)in, s(3, j)in]T be the jth column of state S as the in-
put to MixColumns, and let [s(0, j)out, s(1, j)out, s(2, j)out, s(3, j)out]T be the output
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column. In an encryption process, the MixColumns operation is given by Equa-
tion (2.13).

s(0, j)out
s(1, j)out
s(2, j)out
s(3, j)out

=

0x02 0x03 0x01 0x01
0x01 0x02 0x03 0x01
0x01 0x01 0x02 0x03
0x03 0x01 0x01 0x02


s(0, j)in
s(1, j)in
s(2, j)in
s(3, j)in

(2.13)
The linear transformation has an inverse, thus MixColumns kernel is also in-
vertible. In the decryption process, the InvMixColumn is also conducted by matrix-
vector operations given in Equation (2.14).

s(0, j)invout
s(1, j)invout
s(2, j)invout
s(3, j)invout

=

0x0e 0x0b 0x0d 0x09
0x09 0x0e 0x0b 0x0d
0x0d 0x09 0x0e 0x0b
0x0b 0x0d 0x09 0x0e


s(0, j)invin
s(1, j)invin
s(2, j)invin
s(3, j)invin

(2.14)
Multiplications and additions involved in these matrix-vector operations are
all in Galois field GF(28) with primitive polynomial x8 + x4 + x3 + x1 + 1.
2.1.2.5 Key Expansion
Key expansion is the process of generating a subkey for each round. A private key
is used as the initial key. There are some common operations in Galois field which
are used in key expansion. The first operation is 8-bit circular rotation on a 32-bit
word. The second is a 2-exponentiation of a user-specified value. S-box is applied
on all output bytes.
In summary, the entire AES datapath can be carried directly in Galois field.
Fig. 2.4 [26] illustrates the underlying Galois field operations in each kernel.
14
Figure 2.4: Galois field operations in AES datapath.
2.2 Differential Power Analysis Attacks
A silicon processor can leak information in many ways while operating, as the
physical die generates electrical signal associated with the information it processes
and exposes itself to attackers. For example, the electromagnetic field generated
by the chip can give a lot of information about the chip [27]; another, even easier,
way to infer information about the chip is to monitor the power supply current to
derive the power consumption profile of the chip [1, 28, 29].
AES chips are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that exploit side-channel in-
formation such as power profiling to reveal the secret key used by the chip. Dif-
ferential Power Analysis (DPA) is one of the most effective side-channel attacks.
DPA attacks on conventional CMOS chips exploit the switching-dependent power
profile of the chip, which can be easily obtained in an unobtrusive manner by mon-
itoring power supply currents. A statistical analysis is then performed to correlate
switching behavior with the data used in the computation to reveal the crypto-
graphic key. In this section, we will describe the principle of DPA and how it
works. This section is mostly based on [1], which includes comprehensive infor-
mation about DPA attacks.
DPA attacks are one of the most popular attacks among all side-channel attacks.
The attacker usually does not require very comprehensive information of the dat-
apath to launch the attack, and when based on a large number of data points, DPA
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Figure 2.5: DPA attack 5-step procedure.
attack is noise immune. Compared to other side-channel attacks, the biggest ad-
vantage of DPA attacks is that they do not require comprehensive knowledge of
the chip’s datapath or architecture. Often, knowing the encryption algorithm itself
is enough for a DPA attack to effectively infer the chip’s secret key. In principle, a
DPA attack exploits the data dependencies in the power trace of the chip to reveal
the cryptographic key.
To perform a successful DPA attack, an attacker must understand 5 major pro-
cedures and perform them according to different situation, as shown in Fig. 2.5.
Each of these steps is very important to ensure a successful DPA attack.
The first step is to choose an attack location, i.e., the step of the algorithm at
which the attack is performed. This step determines how much effort it will cost
for the following steps. Selecting an effective attack point is essential for reducing
the probability of unsuccessful attack. First of all, this point has to be associated
with the key. If an intermediate value is not related to a key, it is not an effective
attack point. Moreover, this attack point must be as independent as possible from
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other operations. For example, a point between major computation blocks is ideal
for observing the power trace, since each data block is independent and has less
interference from other data blocks.
The second step is to take power trace measurements. In this step, the attacker
measures the power trace and records the data associated with the power trace. It
is important to reduce noise, both electrical noise and timing noise from synchro-
nization, as much as possible. For each power trace, it is also important to keep
track of its corresponding data.
To reduce noise, electrical noise must be kept at a minimum during an attack
to obtain useful information from the power trace. For example, on-board power
supply routing has to be minimal to reduce interference with other on-board sig-
nals. Another main source of noise is the synchronization noise. Since DPA attack
is based on obtaining large number of power traces that are statistically correlated
with input data, successful alignment of all power traces is crucial. An off-chip
synchronization signal is needed to perform DPA attacks. The jitter of this syn-
chronization signal must be small for effective synchronization. Fig. 2.6, 2.7 and
2.8 show that the final results of DPA attacks can be considerably affected by elec-
tric noise levels.
The third step is calculating the intermediate values of the attack point. By
knowing the algorithm, the attackers can use the input or output data to calculate
all the hypothetical intermediate values of the attack point for all possible keys. For
example, in AES, each key byte has 8 bits, so there are 256 possible values for this
key byte. For these 256 possible key values and the known data associated with the
power trace, attackers can calculate the corresponding 256 possible intermediate
values. This step only requires knowledge of the algorithm.
The fourth step is obtaining a power estimate based on the intermediate values
of the attack point. The objective of this step is to map all hypothetical intermediate
17
Figure 2.6: DPA attack simulation result. Correlation between power model esti-
mation and power trace. Without noise, the correlation for the correct key is 0.88
(very close to maximum value 1), and key can be inferred with high confidence.
Figure 2.7: DPA attack simulation result. Correlation between power model esti-
mation and power trace. With noise at the same level as average power, the correct
key hypothesis correlation is 0.47, and the key can still be inferred with relative
moderate confidence.
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Figure 2.8: DPA attack simulation result. Correlation between power model esti-
mation and power trace. With noise at twice the level of average power, the correct
key correlation is 0.32 (only marginally higher than all the other hypotheses), and
the key is inferred with low confidence
values to corresponding power consumption hypotheses through a certain power
model. Depending on the transition of the intermediate values, the power model
will have an estimated power value, which will be subsequently used for correla-
tion. The quality of the model is important, and Hamming weight and Hamming
distance are commonly suggested [1].
The fifth step is to correlate the power estimation values with the power trace
measurement results. After obtaining (i) the power estimation values for all key
hypotheses based on a power model, and (ii) the power trace measurements, each
estimation is compared with the measured power trace to find the most similar
estimation through statistic analysis. In the beginning, the correlation values of all
hypotheses tend to have similar values, implying that none of them is close enough
to the correct key. In this case, the attacker simply needs to measure more power
traces to increase correlation values for a subset of candidate keys and improve
chances to reveal the actual key.
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of 5 steps in DPA attacks [1].
Mathematical illustration of this 5-step procedure is shown in Fig. 2.9.
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Figure 2.10: Extrinsic DPA resistance. This method augments the unprotected core
with countermeasure circuits to scramble its supply voltage and current.
2.3 Methods against DPA Attacks
Many methods have been proposed to date to defend against DPA attacks. Each
of them has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Extrinsic solutions [2, 30, 31, 32], as shown in Fig. 2.10, are popular due to
their straightforward implementations. This defense mechanism augments an un-
protected core with countermeasure circuits that scramble its supply voltage and
current. This approach is not amenable to voltage scaling when the scrambled
supply voltage is limited to a certain minimum level, and no work reports on its
performance under voltage scaling.
Intrinsic solutions [3, 33, 34, 35], as shown in Fig. 2.11 are the other major
approaches. This defense uses intrinsically DPA-resistant logic gates that exhibit
constant energy consumption during operation and hide the impact of switching
activity from the power trace. This approach typically suffers from high area over-
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Figure 2.11: Intrinsic DPA resistance. This method uses intrinsically DPA-resistant
logic gates.
heads.
2.3.1 Extrinsic Solutions
Extrinsic solutions augment an unprotected core with countermeasure circuits that
scramble its supply voltage and current to conceal its actual power profile. One
such method is to insert a barrier between the power supply and the unprotected
core, so that the attacker cannot obtain any information through monitoring the
outside power profile [2]. This proposed solution is called local switched-capacitor
current equalizer. As shown in Fig. 2.12, the power supply does not directly con-
nect to the unprotected core. A block, called current equalizer with three switching
capacitor modules, has a ”supply transistor” that functions as a switch between the
outside power supply and the rest of the block. It also has a ”logic transistor” that
functions as a switch between the unprotected core and the rest of the block. More-
over, it has a ”shunt transistor” and an on-chip capacitor that function as charge
storage units.
When the chip operates, it iterates three steps. Step one is charging the capac-
itor from the supply. In this step, only the ”supply transistor” is turned on, and
supply will charge the on-chip capacitor to nominal voltage level. Step two is pro-
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Figure 2.12: Demonstration of local switched-capacitor current equalizer [2].
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viding charge to the unprotected core. In this step, only the ”logic transistor” is
turned on, and the capacitor provides charge to the unprotected core. As the cur-
rent flows to the core, the voltage level of the capacitor decreases. Step three is
discharing the capacitor to a pre-defined value. In this step, only the ”shunt tran-
sistor” is turned on to further discharge the capacitor. Therefore, no matter how
much current the unprotected core has drawn in the previous step, this step will
ensure that the capacitor’s charge is dumped and its voltage returns to a constant
value. After step three, step one will begin to charge the capacitor again. Since the
capacitor voltage level is the same, after the completion of step three, the power
supply provides the same amount of charge every time, and an outside attacker
cannot obtain any power profile through monitoring of the power supply.
The advantage of the above method is its low area overhead like all the other
extrinsic solutions. However, the unstable supply voltage to the unprotected core
limits its performance and voltage scalability. For example, the voltage fluctuation
can be up to 100mV in [2].
2.3.2 Intrinsic Solutions
Intrinsic solutions utilize intrinsically DPA-resistant logic gates that exhibit con-
stant or nearly-constant energy consumption during operation to hide the impact
of switching activity from the power trace.
One example is the WDDL logic [3]. WDDL gates use single-rail CMOS gates
along with inverter pairs to mimic the behavior of a static dual-rail gate. WDDL
adopts a pipeline flushing mechanism to ensure the switching-independent energy
dissipation of each WDDL gate.
The main disadvantage of the WDDL design is the high area and energy over-
head, because WDDL contains several CMOS gates in a single WDDL gate. Ac-
cording to the measurements result shown in [3], the WDDL AES core has 4× area
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Figure 2.13: Illustration of WDDL gate [3].
and 6× energy consumption compared to its CMOS counterpart.
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CHAPTER 3
DPA-Resistant Design for High-End
Applications: 1.32GHz High-Throughput
Charge-Recovery AES Core
AES is widely used in high-end applications, due to its simplicity and high secu-
rity. In contrast, although ECC [36] (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is much more
secure, its complexity limits its performance, so ECC is only a authentication level
encryption code. This chapter proposes of a high performance hardware AES ac-
celerator with DPA resistance. By exploiting the security potential and energy ef-
ficiency of charge recovery logic, a new charge recovery logic family is proposed.
The proposed approach is evaluated through silicon prototyping.
A 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core targeted for high-performance
security applications is designed and fabricated in a 65nm CMOS technology. A
novel charge-recovery logic family, called Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), is introduced
in this design to achieve switching-independent energy dissipation for an intrin-
sic high resistance against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Based on
measurements, the AES core achieves a throughput of 16.90Gbps and power con-
sumption of 98mW, exhibiting 720x higher DPA resistance and 30% lower power
than its conventional CMOS counterpart at the same clock frequency. The work
described in this chapter has appeared in [37].
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3.1 Introduction
AES is a popular encryption method that is often implemented in dedicated hard-
ware to achieve high performance and energy efficiency [38, 39]. AES chips are
vulnerable to side-channel attacks that exploit side-channel information such as
power profiling to reveal the secret key used by the chip. Differential Power Anal-
ysis (DPA) is one of the most effective side-channel attacks [40]. DPA attacks on
conventional CMOS chips exploit the switching-dependent power profile of the
chip, which can be easily obtained in an unobtrusive manner by monitoring power
supply currents. A statistical analysis is then performed to correlate switching be-
havior with the data used in the computation, to reveal the cryptographic key used
in the chip[2, 3, 30].
Previous AES prototype chips with DPA resistance have been demonstrated
at clock rates up to 255MHz. One approach against DPA is to add countermea-
sure circuits around an unprotected CMOS core to inject noise or erase the infor-
mation content on the power trace [2, 30]. Another effective approach uses logic
gates designed with nearly constant power consumption to diminish the impact
of switching activity on the power trace, but these designs incur high performance
and power penalties [3]. Both the existing extrinsic and intrinsic solutions suffer
from performance limitations, due to logic gate design overhead or unstable sup-
ply voltage.
This chapter describes a 128-bit AES core running at 1.32GHz with intrinsic
DPA resistance. A new charge-recovery logic, called Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), is
proposed for the design of this AES core to ensure a switching-independent power
profile that is intrinsically immune to DPA attacks and provides power savings at
a GHz speed. Measurement results show that this AES core is the fastest among
published DPA-resistant chips [2, 3, 30]. Unlike previous approaches toward DPA
resistance that incur power overhead or speed degradation, this DPA-resistant AES
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core reduces power consumption over its conventional static CMOS counterpart
and maintains a high throughput. Running at 16.90Gbps with 98mW, this core is
720x more DPA resistant and consumes 30% lower power than its static CMOS
counterpart operating at the same clock speed.
The remainder of this chapter has 4 sections. Section 3.2 gives background on
charge recovery. Section 3.3 introduces BBL. Section 3.4 discusses floorplanning
and clock mesh design. Section 3.5 explains the DPA attack setup, presents mea-
surement results, and concludes this chapter.
3.2 Charge Recovery
3.2.1 Overview of Fundamentals
This BBL design addresses the security problem at high end applications by adopt-
ing charge recovery technique [41, 42, 43, 44]. This section will describe the basic
principles of charge recovery logic.
In traditional digital circuits, the CMOS gate switches the output logic value by
connecting its fanout either to the supply voltage Vdd or ground Vss. By charging
or discharging the output capacitance, the output voltage level will either be Vdd
or Vss. Therefore, by observing the voltage level of the output, its logic status can
be determined.
A CMOS gate can be viewed as a RC network, as shown in Fig. 3.1. During
gate operation, the fanout loading, modeled as CL, will be charged or discharged
depending on the logic value. When S1 is turned on and S2 is turned off, the fanout
loading is charged from supply Vdd, and the current goes through resistor R. The
total energy drawn from the power supply is CLV2, where the energy consumed
by the resistor is 12CLV
2, and the energy stored in fanout capacitance CL is 12CLV
2.
When the gate is discharged, S2 is turned on, S1 is turned off, and the charge in
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Figure 3.1: RC network equivalent of a CMOS gate, and illustration of charging or
discharging waveform. R and S1 model the PMOS transistor, R and S2 model the
NMOS transistor, and power source provides ideal constant power supply voltage
Vdd[4].
the fanout capacitance is dumped through S2 and R to the ground. The charging
and discharging time depends on RCL.
But charge recovery is different in terms of charging and discharging. As ex-
plained in [4], the charge recovery logic charges and discharges the output loading
in a n-step manner as shown in Fig. 3.2. In the ideal case, the n-step voltage
source can increase the voltage by Vdd/n of each step, and the time interval is
T/2n. Therefore, when charging the capacitor CL, as long as the T/2n is much
larger than the RC constant, this circuit will ensure the voltage level of this capaci-
tor reaches the desired voltage. The energy consumption of each step is shown in
Equation (3.1).
CL(Vn )
2
2
=
CLV2
2n2
(3.1)
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Therefore, the total energy consumption for the n steps is given by the product,
as shown in Equation (3.2).
CLV2
2n2
n =
CLV2
2n
(3.2)
At the end, the total energy drawn from the power supply still has two parts:
one is the energy eventually stored in the capacitor, which is 12CLV
2; the other is
the energy loss on the resistor, which is 12n CLV
2. In this case, the energy loss on the
resistor is reduced to only 1n of the original energy loss in conventional CMOS.
As shown in Fig. 3.2, it is the same case when discharging the capacitance in
n steps. The charge from the load flows back to the source without dissipating
all the energy stored in the load. Using a math calculation similar to the charging
process, the energy loss on the resistor is again 1n
1
2CLV
2 which is only a fraction of
the power consumption in CMOS, as the CMOS gate dumps all the charge to the
ground and wastes all the energy. In practice, the power supply can be designed
to support n-step charge/discharge and recover the charge stored in capacitance
instead of sending it to ground.
Mathematically, as the number of steps n increases, the energy consumption
decreases, assuming that T/2n is still large enough for the RC network to fully
charge or discharge to the desired voltage level. Alternatively, we can think of
T/2n as a value that is defined by the RC constant of the network. In that case,
increasing n means increasing T. So energy saving trade-off is related with T; the
longer T is, the more energy is saved.
To summarize, this section has briefly introduced the principles of the charge
recovery logic and the tradeoff between operating speed and energy saving. The
power supply in charge recovery logic has certain timing constraints, and we dis-
cuss power supply realization and timing in the next section.
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Figure 3.2: RC equivalent network of charge recovery logic [4], along with its
charging and discharging transition. The power source functions as ideal n-step
power supply. The duration of each step, T/2n, should be much longer than the
RC constant to ensure high charge recovery rate.
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Figure 3.3: LC resonant network and power clock generation; R models the resis-
tance between inductor and capacitor. The PMOS NMOS transistors function as
negative transconductance to compensate for the energy loss from the resistance.
3.2.2 Power Clock and its Generation
In this section, we describe a practical approach to the generation of a power clock
using an LC resonating network. As shown in Fig. 3.3, the circuit is a classic LC
resonating network. The inductor L is used to store in its magnetic field the energy
in the electric field of the capacitor. The capacitor C stores in its electric field the
energy stored in the inductor’s magnetic field. Ideally, if there is no energy loss,
charge will flow indefinitely between the inductor and the capacitor and a sinusoid
shape waveform will be formed. The frequency of this sinusoid will be 12pi
√
1
LC and
its amplitude will remain constant and never decay.
However, resistance is unavoidable in non-ideal circuitry, non-super-conducting
circuits. It can come from the connection between inductor and capacitor, or the
parasitic resistance of any circuit component. For simplicity, all resistance is mod-
eled as a lump resistance denoted by R. As the RLC network operates, energy is
consumed on R, the amplitude decays and needs to be restored through a mecha-
nism that replenishes energy loss. For example, the PMOS and NMOS transistor
can be turned on periodically and in alignment with the natural frequency of this
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Figure 3.4: LC resonant network and power clock generation. L models the on-chip
inductor with a constant power supply 1/2Vdd, C models the chip capacitance
loading, and R models all the resistance between L and C. The PMOS and NMOS
transistors function as negative transconductance to compensate for the energy
loss from the resistance. PC1 and PC2 are control signals. Their frequency matches
the natural frequency of the LC resonant network, and the duty cycle determine
the strength of energy compensation.
LC network.
As we discussed in Fig. 3.3, if we adopt the signals aligned with LC natural
frequency to the PMOS and NMOS transistor, a power-clock generator circuit will
be obtained, as shown in Fig. 3.4. This single-phase power-clock generation circuit
uses a single inductor to form an LC network and resonate the target capacitance
to form a single-phase sinusoidal clock waveform.
The PMOS and NMOS devices are used to replenish the energy that is dissi-
pated as heat on parasitic resistance. Their switching follows the natural frequency
of the LC network. As the clock voltage at the other end of the inductor reaches its
low point, the NMOS turns on and pulls the voltage to minimum, and restoring
the current in the inductor. On the other hand, the pullup PMOS is turned on when
the clock voltage level reaches the peak, and the PMOS restores the current in the
inductor. The key points of the compensation transistors to work well are as fol-
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Figure 3.5: LC resonant network and blip clock generator [5].
lowing: First, the switching frequency of the NMOS/PMOS devices should match
the natural frequency of the LC resonating network. If it is off, the recovery rate
decreases dramatically and energy loss increases. At the extreme, if the switching
frequency is way off, the circuit will not work at all. Second, the duty cycle of the
trigger pulse has to match the energy loss; if the compensation transistors are not
turned on for enough time, the waveform amplitude cannot be maintained. On
the other hand, if the compensation is too strong, it will waste energy.
There are many other circuits topologies for power clock generation [5, 45, 43,
46, 47]. The topology adopted depends on circuits requirements.
In our design, we use the so-called blip clock generator [5], as shown in Fig.
3.5. The principle of blip clock generation is simple. It targets to generate two
clock waveforms with 180 degree phase difference. As shown in Fig. 3.6, the white
waveform and red waveform have 180 degree phase difference. The blip clock
generation circuit has two inductors and both are tied to the Vdc power supply.
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Figure 3.6: Blip clock generator waveform from spice simulations. The uneven
amplitude of PC and PC b is mainly caused by uneven clock capacitance loadings.
Moreover, it also has two cross-coupled NMOS transistors as negative transcon-
ductance to compensate for the energy loss. Once the LC network is resonating,
the NMOS connected to PC end is turned on when the PC is low and PC b is high,
so the NMOS pulls the PC to a even lower voltage. Similarly, When the PC b is
low and PC is high, the NMOS on the PC b end will be turned on and pull the
PC b voltage level to even lower voltage and compensate for the energy loss. The
R and C in Fig. 3.5 are used to model the resistance between the inductor and gate
loadings in core, and the capacitance from the gate loadings.
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3.3 Bridge Boost Logic (BBL)
Bridge Boost Logic (BBL) is a dynamic charge recovery logic family that enables
high-speed operation with high energy efficiency while offering resistance to DPA
attacks. First, BBL is a dynamic logic which enables GHz operation. It alternates
between two phases: evaluation phase and boost phase. BBL enables deep pipelin-
ing and, consequently high performance. Second, BBL is charge recovery logic
which can operate with high energy efficiency. When operating, it recovers the
charge from its gate fanouts, saving energy consumption based on the charge re-
covery principle described in section 3.2. Third, unlike traditional boost logic [48],
BBL has a bridge equalizer to balance the current flow and voltage level before
boost, therefore, no matter what logic value it was holding and what logic value
it changes to, the energy consumption of every individual gate will be the same
independent from logic status and transition. Hence BBL an be highly resistant
against side channel attacks.
As shown in Fig. 3.7, a BBL gate has two stages, boost stage and evaluation
stage. The boost stage consists of a pair of cross-coupled inverters. The source
terminals of the PMOS gates are connected to the Power Clock (PC). The cross-
coupled inverter pair is used to lock the logic state and boost it up to nominal
voltage level. The key innovation in BBL is the bridge equalizer that connects
the dual-rail outputs. This bridge is a NMOS transistor with its gate connected
to PC b, PC b has 180 degree phase difference as the PC, balancing the current
paths and equalizing the output voltage level of the gate. It ensures that energy
consumption is independent from the logic state and transition. The other stage is
evaluation stage. It has two complementary evaluation networks, like any dual-
rail gate. The evaluation network on the left is used to generate the corresponding
logic value of output Y, and the other evaluation network on the right is used to
generate the complementary value of output Y b. The evaluation stage generates
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Figure 3.7: BBL gate schematic. BBL has two stages: evaluation stage and boost
stage. Evaluation stage uses NMOS transistors for both pull-up-network (PUN)
and pull-down-network (PDN). The evaluation stage on each side of the gate pro-
vides complementary results Y and Y b. The boost stage has a cross-coupled in-
verter pair to boost up the voltage difference generated by evaluation stage. The
bridge transistor in the middle is used to balance the current path, and it results in
logic-independent energy consumption for the gate.
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Figure 3.8: Cascade of BBL gates. BBL gates are denoted as P/N type. To ensure
correct function, P-type gates must connect to N-type gates, and the N-type gates
must connect to P-type gates. To ensure correct functionality. The PC/PC b pins
of P gates are connected to PC/PC b. The PC/PC b pins of N gates are connected
to PC b/PC.
the logic output values based on inputs. The power supply of this stage is called
VDC, which is designed at near-threshold level, to ensure that evaluation stage
consumes energy at near threshold level to save power. This VDC supply is shared
with the inductors. It is possible to active GHz-speed operation with VDC at near-
threshold level and gate output at the full rail (nominal supply voltage).
BBL gate cascades are implemented by alternatively connecting the power-
clock terminals to PC and PC b, as shown in Fig. 3.8. The connection of PC and
PC b is used to identify the phase of a gate. If the PC connects the gate’s boost stage
PMOS transistor source, and the PC b connects the gate of the bridge transistor,
this gate will be called positive phase gate. On the other hand, if the PC b connects
the gate’s boost stage PMOS transistor source, and the PC connects the gate of the
bridge transistor, this gate will be called negative phase gate. The positive phase
gates will only connect to negative gates as their fanin and fanout. Similarly, the
negative phase gates will only connect to positive gates as their fanin and fanout.
Fig. 3.9 shows operating waveforms of a BBL gate, with the positive phase gate
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Figure 3.9: BBL gate operating waveform from spice simulation. PC and PC b have
180 degree phase difference. During evaluation phase, the gate generates an initial
voltage difference depending on logic state. The boost stage boosts this voltage
difference to nominal voltage level.
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Figure 3.10: BBL gate operating waveform in evaluation phase. The evaluation
stage evaluates the logic value and generates the initial voltage difference
that is clocked by PC. The PC and PC b are in pseudo-sinusoid shape and they
have 180 degree phase difference. Both PC and PC b are boosted to near full rail
to ensure no performance degradation.
In the evaluation phase as shown in Fig. 3.10, the inputs to the evaluation stages
receive the input logic values and evaluate the corresponding output logic values.
Since the VDC is only at near threshold level, the voltage level on the output Y and
Y b will only be at near threshold level. During evaluation, the evaluation stage
is given enough time to ensure a sufficiently large voltage at its output. Since the
input voltage of the evaluation stage is at nominal levels, its performance is not
degraded.
During the boost phase, shown in Fig. 3.11, as PC voltage increases, the cross-
coupled inverters in the boost stage first lock the initial voltage difference created
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Figure 3.11: BBL gate operating waveform in boost phase. The boost stage boosts
from the initial voltage to nominal voltage levels, and then recovers the charge.
by the evaluation stage and further boost it up to the nominal supply voltage level,
ensuring that there is no performance degradation of the evaluation phase of the
following gates. As PC voltage decreases and returns to low voltage level, the
charge of the output is recovered and returned to the power supply. The gate
keeps alternating between evaluation phase and boost phase.
Power savings come from two parts. First, during the evaluation phase, the
power supply is at near threshold level, so the voltage difference is created using
much less energy than evaluate at nominal voltage. Second, during boost phase,
charge is recovered through the sinusoid PC waveform, so the boost phase saves
power as well.
Fig. 3.12 shows the spice output waveform simulation of a gate operating un-
der the waveform generated by blip clock generation circuits. While the gate is op-
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Figure 3.12: BBL gate operating waveform from spice simulations. To ensure reli-
able operation, the evaluation stage is designed to generate a voltage difference of
approximately 250mV.
erating, the voltage difference generated by the evaluation stage is around 250mV
for two reasons. First, to make sure that there is enough voltage difference margin
for the boost stage to boost from to ensure the correct functionality; second, higher
initial voltage difference reduces short-circuit current through the boost stage.
The bridge transistor, as shown in Fig. 3.13, is the key innovation in BBL. The
bridge transistor’s gate is tied to PC b, taken positive gate as an example. In the
positive gate evaluation phase, as the PC b voltage goes up to nominal voltage
level, the bridge transistor is turned on, and in the meanwhile the pull-up-network
and the pull-down-network evaluate the correct logic level. Since the bridge tran-
sistor is on and shorting the pull-up and the pull-down networks on the opposite
sides of the evaluation stages, the gate conducts the same current regardless of its
previous state. At the end of the evaluation phase, the bridge transistor ensures
that the voltage difference of the complementary outputs remains the same and
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Figure 3.13: Function of bridge transistor. The bridge transistor is used to balance
the current path in evaluation phase, so that the evaluation stage sees the same cur-
rent path and consumes the same amount of energy regardless of the logic value.
It also ensures that the initial voltage difference after evaluation phase is the same
across cycles, so that the boost stage always boosts from the same voltage level,
consuming the same amount of energy during each boost phase.
43
Figure 3.14: BBL gate latch-based operation. BBL can be viewed as a CMOS latch
followed by a CMOS gate.
independent of switching direction, enabling PC to always boost from about the
same voltage level, and thus yielding a switching-independent power profile.
The bridge transistor is the key difference between BBL and Subthreshold Boost
Logic (SBL) [4]. It helps increase resistance to DPA attack at the price of higher
energy consumption. BBL consumes more energy than SBL, because the bridge
transistor introduces a path during evaluation, leading to short-circuit currents
between power supply and ground through evaluation networks, and increasing
power consumption. During the boost phase, because the voltage difference to
boost from is larger in BBL than in SBL, the energy required in BBL to boost the in-
termediate voltage at the end of the evaluation phase is higher than in SBL. There-
fore, BBL consumes more power while operating, but provides superior resistance
to DPA attacks.
This paragraph explains the sequential operation of BBL gate. BBL is essentially
a two-phase latch-based dynamic logic. As shown in Fig. 3.14, a positive phase
gate is always followed by a negative phase gate, and vice versa. Power clocks
with 180 degree phase difference are fed to corresponding gates. For the positive
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phase gate, the PC pin connects to PC, and PC b pin connects to PC b. On the
other hand, for the negative phase gate, the PC pin connects to PC b, and PC b pin
connects to PC. The gate functions mostly like a CMOS latch followed by a CMOS
gate. Therefore, it features intrinsic gate-level pipelining to allow extremely high-
performance.
The layout of a BBL inverter gate is shown in Fig. 3.15. The top rail is power
supply and the bottom rail is ground. The transistors on the right from the middle
green line form the boost stage. The transistors on the left of the middle green
line form the evaluation stage. This layout is relatively sparse because the gate is
simply an inverter and must still meet the standard height of other gates.
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Figure 3.15: BBL gate layout illustration.
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3.4 Floorplan and Clock Mesh
As mentioned in Section 3.2, BBL is a charge recovery logic, which is powered by a
pseudo sinusoid shape power clock. BBL requires a specialized power clock distri-
bution network. In this section we describe the floorplaning and clock distribution.
Figure 3.16: LC resonant network model. On-chip inductors function as induc-
tance in the network, the transistors and the clock distribution are modeled as
resistors, and gate fanout loads are modeled as capacitors. The switches represent
the logic evaluation stages.
The power clock is the key enabler of transferring charges between each in-
dividual gate and the on-chip inductors, so its distribution must rely on a low-
resistance medium such as a clock mesh. By using a clock mesh, there is no tran-
sistors between gates and inductors to prevent charge sharing. As shown in Fig.
3.16, this clock mesh functions as resistor, therefore the less resistive it is, the less
energy will be wasted through this clock mesh. Two approaches can help reduce
clock distribution network resistance. The first approach is to have a dense mesh
network; the denser it is, the less resistance it will have. Second approach is to
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distribute using higher metal layers, because these layers are usually thicker, and
therefore have less resistance. We cannot sacrifice too much routing metal space,
so the mesh cannot be too dense, since taking too much metal makes automatic
place and route less efficient. Another reason we cannot have too dense clock
mesh is that this mesh also functions as part of the capacitance which forms the
LC resonant circuits, More and wider wires result in more capacitance on the clock
distribution network, and large capacitance requires more drivers and consumes
more power.
Figure 3.17: Power clock generation and distribution, including on-chip inductors
and clock mesh distribution network, and distributed NMOS pairs functioning as
negative transconductance.
The power clock mesh design is shown in Fig. 3.17. It has two power clock
meshes, one for the PC and one for the PC b. The clock meshes in this design
utilize metal layers 4, 5, 8 and 9 (metal layer 9 is the highest metal layer). Metal
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layers 4 and 5 are used to distribute the power clock to each individual gate as they
are lower metal and can reduce the resistance between gates and clock mesh, as the
clock pins of the gates are connected through metal layer 2 and 3 to the closest point
of this lower mesh. Metal layer 8 is then used to fulfill top layer connections of all
the lower layer mesh, and provide more equalization of the clock distribution. A
clock ring composed of metal layers 8 and 9 is designed to surround the design.
The inductor attached to the clock mesh is shown in Fig. 3.18. This inductor
has width of 195um and length of 168um. It uses metal layer 8 and 9 and the stripe
width is 15um with spacing of 2um. Its inner radius is 30um. Targeting operation
at 1.4GHz, this inductor has inductance of approximately 500pH and Q factor of
8.8. The guard ring has width of 10um which protects it from other on chip signal
interference. The physical image of the inductor on die is shown in Fig. 3.19. As
you can see, the yellow metal is metal layer 9.
Figure 3.18: Inductor layout illustration used in BBL design.
As shown in Fig. 3.17, there are two such inductors connected to the clock mesh,
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Figure 3.19: Physical inductor image used in BBL design
one on the left and one on the right. Having one inductor on each side, the flow of
power-clock charge is more balanced, and clock skew is reduced.
Another key component to be considered when floorplaning is the cross-coupled
NMOS pairs which function as negative resistance to compensate energy loss from
the resistance of the clock distribution networks and the cross-coupled inverters in
the boost stage of each gate. In this design, 72 distributed cross-coupled NMOS
transistor pairs are used to maintain resonating waveform amplitude. The NMOS
pairs have to be evenly distributed to keep the driven strength balanced.
In general, charge recovery design needs more attention when it comes to floor-
planing. First, the total gate count should be estimated upfront to decide how
much inductance this design needs to achieve desired frequency. Second, based on
frequency, the density of clock mesh will be decided. The higher the frequency, the
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denser the clock mesh, because more current will be delivered through the mesh.
Also, the number of inductors used must be deduced based on the inductance re-
quirements of the design, and inductor placement should be balanced. Finally,
the drivers distribution also plays big role, depends on the frequency and loading
from clock mesh and gates. Higher frequency and bigger loadings needs more and
bigger drivers. The die photo of BBL design is shown in Fig. 3.20.
Figure 3.20: Image of BBL core from physical die, including on-chip inductors, BBL
AES datapath, and peripheral test circuits.
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3.5 Experimental Setup and Evaluation
3.5.1 DPA Attack Test Setup
Beyond the step required for standard silicon testing, the DPA attack setup re-
quires fast and highly accurate test equipment and reliable on-board test compo-
nent setup. The DPA attack testing setup we used for evaluating the effectiveness
of our proposed approach to high-performance low-power DPA-resistant design
is discussed comprehensively in this subsection.
Figure 3.21: DPA attack test model, including power supply, bulk capacitor around
800uF for steady supply voltage, BBL test chip, and 1ohm resistor to convert chip
current into voltage for oscilloscope measurement.
The testing board is very similar to boards designed for standard testing. All
power supplies are connected through on-board capacitors to eliminate the noise
on the supply voltage level. All control signals and data signals are accessed
through either on-chip switches or the scan chain control connected to a computer.
The key difference on the testing board is the DPA testing related components, as
shown in Fig.3.21. To perform DPA attacks, the current consumed by the chip has
to be measured. In this design, we take a simple and reliable approach. To mea-
sure the current, a small 1ohm resistor is inserted on the testing board between the
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power supply and the chip, and is close proximity to the chip. As the current flow-
ing into the chip changes, the voltage difference on this 1ohm resistor will follow
this change accordingly to obtain this voltage difference. As long as the resistor
terminal on the supply end maintains constant voltage, we only need to measure
the voltage on the terminal close to the chip. In this case, by simply monitoring the
voltage of the terminal on the chip end, we can get the current fluctuation.
As shown in Fig. 3.22, power supplies are needed to provide constant voltage
source to the board, and the power supplies are also needed to track the average
power consumption of the chip. As mentioned above, the current drawn by chip is
converted to voltage, which is easier to collect using oscilloscope, so that we need
to connect the oscilloscope probe to the terminal on the chip side of the resistor.
An oscilloscope quality is very important in the DPA attack test, we use up to 40G
sample per second sampling rate oscilloscope.
Figure 3.22: Testing devices, including testing chip, power supply, oscilloscope
and on-board current probe.
Because the effectiveness of the DPA attack largely depends on the accuracy
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and the sampling rate of the current measurements, the oscilloscope must provide
sufficient sensitivity and speed. In our case, the chip speed is targeting at more
than 1GHz, so the sampling rate of the oscilloscope has to theoretically exceed the
2GHz Nyquist rate. In our test setup, we used an oscilloscope (with up to 40G/s
sample rate ) with sampling rate of 10GHz sampling rate to crack the key.
Figure 3.23: PCB design demonstration. To ensure a successful DPA attack, on-
board power supply routing between the chip and the resistor must be kept as
short as possible to minimize interaction with other on-board components.
To minimize the noise interference from the board, the power supply routing
between the chip and the resistor has to minimize its length, as shown in Fig. 3.23,
so that the power trace does not pick up noise by coupling with other wires. But
the power trace routing wire cannot be ideal and kept minimal when the designer
has to route other signal wires (not shown in the figure).
Fig. 3.24 shows the lab test setup of the DPA attack. To test the chip’s DPA
resistance, all power rails must have independent and stable power supplies, in-
cluding the peripheral test circuitry. Moreover, test equipment is placed close to
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the test board to minimize the electrical background noise picked up by wires.
Figure 3.24: Experimental setup for DPA attack.
3.5.2 DPA Measurement Results
For comparison, along with the BBL-based DPA-resistant AES core, a conventional
CMOS AES core is fabricated using a 65nm static CMOS standard cell library as
shown in Fig. 3.25. The CMOS core has the same architecture and target frequency
as the BBL-based core.
Fig. 3.26 shows the measured transient power supply current of the two AES
cores. The CMOS current in Fig. 3.26 (a) shows considerable variations due to
the switching activity, along with the synchronization signal, the current draw has
obvious pattern as each positive edge of the synchronization signal. On the other
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Figure 3.25: CMOS die photo.
hand the BBL current in Fig. 3.26 (b) shows no appreciable variation to reveal any
switching activity.
DPA attacks rely on large amounts of data and statistical analysis, therefore
attackers will always try to harvest as much data as possible while the chip is
running. In our case, we attack the interface point after the Sbox and before Mix-
Column as it is the most predictable point in AES dapapath. Since this point is
right after the Sbox, as mentioned in Section 2.1, the Sbox operation is 8-bit based
so that we can expect that all 8-bit data arrives at approximately the same time,
and is well separated from the next 8-bit data.
Both cores are attacked in the same manner using DPA. Throughout an attack,
the chip keeps encrypting, and the secret key used by the chip remains fixed and
does not change. Random plain text are fed into the chip and are tracked through-
out an attack. For each 128-bit plain text, AES runs the whole encryption process.
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Figure 3.26: Transient power supply current (@ 600MHz). The CMOS core shows
a pattern while the BBL core shows no appreciable variation.
The associated voltage values during the entire encryption process are harvested
from the oscilloscope and stored for later use. Note that the power trace captured
must align with the data fed into the chip. Data harvesting is done through a semi-
automatic process. After we collect a set of traces, (in this demo, 256 different input
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Table 3.1: Illustration of Hamming distance. The value of Hamming distance de-
pends on how many bits are flipped in a binary array.
Original
value 0000 1111 0000 1111 0011 0011 1100 1100
Transformed
value 1111 0000 0000 1111 0000 1110 1110 1111
Hamming
Distance 4 4 0 0 2 3 1 2
data are collected as a set of traces), we attempt to reveal the secret key by per-
forming one attack on the collected data. We continue collecting more traces and
perform the attack on the cumulative data until the secret key is revealed. Ham-
ming distance is our DPA attack model. The Hamming distance simply means
how many bits are flipped in an array after transition. For example, as shown in
Table 3.1, if a 4-bit array 0000 changes to 1111 after transition, the Hamming dis-
tance of this transition is 4, because 4 bits changed; similarly, if a 4-bit array 1111
changes to 0000, the Hamming distance is 4 as well, for all the 4 bits changed its
value. Notice that regardless of the direction a bit changes, the Hamming distance
is 1. So, if none of the bits changes during transition, the Hamming distance is 0.
For the transition from 0011 to 1110, the Hamming distance is 3.
We use statistical analysis to find out what key the chip is using. Once we
have the power trace and its corresponding data, we can take the data through
Hamming distance model. In this step, we take all the 256 possible key values for
one 8-bit key byte, and based on the data fed into the chip while its running, we
can have 256 Hamming distance values for all the 256 possible keys, one Hamming
distance value for one key possibility. We then compare all 256 Hamming distance
values to the corresponding power trace to find out which one has the strongest
correlation. And this is for one attack on one trace, it is simply not enough to
attack with only one power trace. Depending on the DPA resistance of the design,
hundreds or thousands of power traces must be collected before inferring the key
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with enough confidence.
Figure 3.27: CMOS DPA attack measurements. This graph shows the correlation
value of all the key candidates vs. number of measurements. After about 250
measurements, the correlation value of the correct key exceeds those of all incorrect
candidates and continues to increase with the number of measurements.
Fig. 3.27 shows how the correlation values vary as the number of collected
power traces increases. A measurement is the power trace collected for one in-
put data. The dashed line gives the maximum correlation value achieved among
all 255 possible keys (the correct key exclusive). The dotted line gives the mini-
mum correlation value. The solid line gives the correlation for the correct key. The
max/min correlation values do not change appreciably with the number of mea-
surements. In contrast to this, the correlation value of the correct key goes higher
as the number of power traces increases. Measurement to disclosure (MTD) of a
byte in the key is the number of measurements needed for the correlation of the
correct key value to surpass the correlation of all other 255 values [2]. MTD of
the first cracked byte in the key is 250 in Fig. 3.27. More detailed MTD results are
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illustrated in the next Section (Table. 3.2).
Figure 3.28: CMOS DPA attack measurements histogram. After a certain number
of measurements, the correlation value of the correct key candidate largely exceeds
that of all incorrect key candidates, resulting in key inference with high confidence.
Another way to look at the correlation result is to compare all the correlation
values of all the key candidates. As shown in Fig. 3.28, after 2.5K measurements,
the correlation value of the correct key significantly exceeds the maximum corre-
lation value of all other incorrect key candidates. In this case, one can assume that
this is the correct key with high confidence.
Fig. 3.27 shows that the CMOS core is straightforward to crack, since the corre-
lation of the correct key exceeds others after just 250 power traces measured. After
2.5K measurements, the correlation value of the correct key is obviously higher
than others (more than 1.5× higher than the max correlation of incorrect keys).
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Figure 3.29: BBL DPA attack measurements. This graph shows that after 300K
measurements, the correlation value for the correct key becomes only marginally
higher than that for all the incorrect key candidates. Even after 500K measure-
ments, it is still indistinguishable. Therefore, the BBL design exhibits strong DPA
resistance, requiring higher effort and longer time to crack the key.
Fig. 3.29 presents the result of DPA attack on the BBL core. It was after more
than 250K measurements, that the correlation value of the correct key starts to ex-
ceed others. Furthermore, as the number of measurements increases, the correla-
tion value remains marginally higher than the rest. As a consequence, the attacker
cannot claim that this is the correct key with high confidence. Even if an attacker
infers the correct key based on this result, we conclude that the BBL core is at least
720x more DPA resistant than the CMOS core by taking the ratio of the MTD (of
the first cracked byte in the key) in the BBL core and the CMOS core. In practice,
in order to infer the key in CMOS core, an attacker would require several minutes,
which is dominated by the time to collect data. It will take tens of minutes or even
hours to reveal the key in the BBL core. In an AES system that periodically changes
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keys, an attacker will consequently have insufficient time to infer the key.
Figure 3.30: BBL DPA attack measurements histogram. Even after 500K measure-
ments, the correlation value of the correct key candidate is still marginally higher
than that of all incorrect key candidates.
Fig. 3.30 shows the correlation values of the 256 possible keys after 500k mea-
surements. As shown in Fig. 3.30, even if the attacker collected a large amount
of data, for example 500k measurements, the correlation value of the correct key
remains only marginally higher than the maximum correlation of incorrect key
candidates. This result indicates that an attacker cannot infer a key with high confi-
dence even with a large number of measurements. It could only be less confidence
on inferring a key with limited time to collect measurements.
In summary, the BBL core is safer than the conventional CMOS core by provid-
ing at least 720× higher DPA resistance. Moreover it is extremely difficult to break
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the key in a BBL core given the fact that at least 180k measurements are required
to infer a byte of the secret key.
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3.5.3 Electrical Measurement Results
We compare the electrical characteristics of two chips (CMOS core and BBL core)
in terms of performance frequency, power consumption and silicon area.
Figure 3.31: Die photos of both cores. A drawback of BBL design is its area over-
head.
First of all, in terms of area, the charge recovery indeed consumes a bigger area
compared to CMOS design, as the core itself is 2x as large as the CMOS core exclud-
ing the inductors overhead. Including inductor overheads, the BBL core is approx-
imately 3x larger than the CMOS core, with inductors accounting for 26.5% of BBL
core area. Fig. 3.31 shows the two cores’ dies side by side. Charge recovery gate is
larger than CMOS because despite the evaluation stage which has similar area as
the CMOS gate already, it has the boost stage. To ensure reasonable energy saving,
the boost stage’s PMOS transistors have to be sufficiently wide to reduce the resis-
tance, because the smaller the resistance, less energy will be wasted through this
resistance. In addition to the boost stages, the on-chip negative-transconductance
NMOS pairs also take moderate area. One more thing to mention for the core itself
is the metal density. The dual-rail logic requires double the metal area for routing
64
Table 3.2: AES BBL and CMOS designs characteristics.
Parameter BBL CMOS
Technology 65nm
Supply
Voltage(V) 0.41 1
Area
(mm2)
Logic 0.230
0.097Logic+
Inductors 0.291
Maximum
Frequency(GHz) 1.32
Maximum
Throughput(Gb/s) 16.90
Power
(mW) 98.0 138.1
Measurements to Disclosure
Min(1st block)
Mean
Max(Last block)
180k
526k
940k
250
1360
3750
DPA Resistance
Ratio of MTD
of 1st block
720x
Bytes not
disclosed
(out of 16)
0 0
fanout wires. 20% of metal layers 4 and 5 are consumed by the clock mesh distri-
bution which also limits routing resources. On top of all, there is additional 26.5%
inductor overhead over the logic area. So, the price of BBL really comes from area.
Measurements from the two cores are shown in Table 3.2.
In terms of the performance, both cores attain a maximum clock frequency of
1.32GHz, yielding a throughput of 16.90Gbps. The major difference of BBL com-
pared to other charge recovery designs is that it achieves superior frequency. BBL
shows the feasibility of charge recovery logic for high-end application. Because
theoretically, the slower the speed, the higher energy saving charge recovery logic
can achieve, and that is why all the conventional charge recovery design is target-
ing at low frequency. We demonstrate that charge recovery is also suitable for high
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performance domain when the LC network and clock mesh are tuned accordingly.
Supply voltage in CMOS core is 1V, which is nominal. The supply voltage in BBL
core is only 0.41V, which is at near-threshold level. However, because this voltage
is boosted up to nominal voltage, the performance will not be sacrificed.
Dissipating 98mW, the BBL core consumes 30% less power than its CMOS coun-
terpart. At the end of the day, even with all the energy consumption comes from
the clock distribution network and energy compensation components, BBL still
saves appreciable power.
Besides the electrical characteristics comparison, high DPA resistance is the
most important feature of this BBL core. Measurements to disclosure (MTD) is
defined as how many measurements or how many power traces harvested will be
enough to crack the key. As shown in Table 3.2, the weakest key byte in CMOS
core only needs 250 power traces to crack, leaving the CMOS core very vulnerable.
On the other hand, it takes 180k measurements to crack the weakest key byte in the
BBL core. By comparing these numbers, the BBL core yields at least 720x higher
DPA resistance than the CMOS core.
Fig. 3.32 shows the normalized power dissipation and performance of the BBL
core and other published AES designs [2, 3, 30, 49].
The designs in [2, 3, 30] are DPA resistant with MTD of 1st block ranging from
66x to 2500x compared to an unprotected core, and throughput lower than 5Gbps.
At 16.90Gbps, the BBL core almost matches the performance of the fastest, but
unprotected, AES core published to date [49], while also providing 720x DPA re-
sistance.
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Figure 3.32: Comparison with previously published AES chips
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CHAPTER 4
DPA-Resistant Design for Low-End
Applications: 1.25pJ/bit Energy-Efficient
Dual-Rail AES Core
This chapter describes the proposed new low-end logic architecture for DPA resis-
tant hardware accelerator. An AES core for low-cost and energy-efficient IoT se-
curity applications is fabricated to demonstrate its effectiveness in a 65nm CMOS
technology. A novel Dual-Rail Flush Logic (DRFL) with switching-independent
power profile is used to yield intrinsic resistance against Differential Power Anal-
ysis (DPA) attacks with minimum area and energy consumption. Measurement re-
sults show that this 0.048mm2 core achieves energy consumption as low as 1.25pJ/bit
while providing at least 2604x higher DPA resistance over its conventional CMOS
counterpart.
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4.1 Introduction
This section describes a voltage-scalable full-datapath 128-bit AES chip with intrin-
sic DPA resistance that is suitable for Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications thanks
to its energy-efficient operation and small die area [50]. Compared to previous
DPA-protected cores [2, 3, 30], this chip is the smallest, most energy-efficient, and
most DPA-resistant.
4.2 Dual-Rail Flush Logic (DRFL) and Architecture
For low-end security applications, a new logic family called Dual-Rail Flush Logic
(DRFL) is proposed to provide the security against DPA attacks and superior en-
ergy efficiency at low frequency clock frequencies by adopting near-threshold op-
eration.
A DRFL XOR logic gate is shown in Fig. 4.1. DRFL gate is a derivative of
static dual-rail CMOS logic [51]. As shown in Fig. 4.1, thanks to it dual-rail nature,
this DRFL XOR gate has balanced pull-up network and pull-down network and
utilizes the dual-rail inputs to eliminate the extra transistors used in a single-rail
CMOS gate. For example, the static dual-rail logic only has 12 transistors in a XOR
gate compared to single-rail CMOS XOR gate’s 10 transistors.
The difference between DRFL gates and static dual-rail gates comes from the
way it operates. As shown in Fig. 4.2, when inputs A (A b) and B (B b) present
valid complementary logic values (as shown in Fig. 4.2, A=1, A b=0, B=0, B b=1),
the gate is in evaluation mode, and output Y (Y b) presents valid complementary
values (Y=1, Y b=0). So, in evaluation mode, the gate functions just like a regular
static dual-rail logic gate.
When all inputs are set to the same value, the gate is in precharge mode (as
shown in Fig. 4.2, A=1, A b=1, B=1, B b=1) , and the output presents the opposite
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Figure 4.1: DRFL XOR gate. It has the same structure as a static dual-rail gate.
Due to the advantage of the dual-rail inputs, this XOR gate has only 12 transistors
compared to 10 transistors in a single-rail CMOS gate.
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Figure 4.2: Input and output values of a DRFL XOR gate for precharge and evalu-
ation mode. In evaluation mode, a DRFL gate functions in the same manner as a
dual-rail static gate. In precharge mode, when all inputs are forced to 1, both com-
plementary outputs are 0. Therefore, when the gate is alternating between evalua-
tion mode and precharge mode, energy consumption remains about the same.
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value (Y=0, Y b=0). During consecutive cycles in its operation, the gate alternates
between evaluation mode and precharge mode.
Switching-independent energy dissipation is achieved through the alternation
between evaluation mode and precharge mode. In this gate, regardless of in-
put/output transition, one output will always be high in evaluation mode, and
the other output will be low. When changing from precharge mode to evaluation
mode, the gate always changes one output, and consumes the same amount of en-
ergy. On the other hand, when changing from evaluation mode back to precharge
mode, one output will always return to the default value. (In this example, both
outputs Y and Y b return to 0.)
In cascades of DRFL gates, adjacent gates precharge to opposite values, as
shown in Fig. 4.3, with the gates precharging to 1/0 denoted as P/N gates re-
spectively. To ensure correct operation, P gates must connect to N gates, and N
gates must connect to P gates. When computing, the whole pipeline is in evalu-
ation mode, so by having differential inputs in the beginning of the pipeline, the
data will propagate through like regular static dual-rail logic and the desired logic
values will be computed at the end of the pipeline.
When the whole pipeline is in precharge mode, the inputs of the first gate will
be forced to the same value in the beginning of the pipeline. As shown in the
example of Fig. 4.3, all input data are 0, so that all P gates output 1. Therefore, all
the N gates will get all 1 inputs data, and after passing all N gates, the data will
be all 0 again. So, in this case, all the gates will reach a steady precharge mode
after the propagation is done. The connection of the gate is very important in this
design for reaching a steady precharge mode, as P gates must connect to N gates,
and N gates must connect to P gates.
To ensure correct operation, buffers must be inserted so that for every pair of
gates connected by a combinational logic path, the gate counts of all such paths
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Figure 4.3: DRFL gates are denoted as P/N type depending on their precharge
output. If both outputs are 1, gate type is P. If both outputs are 0, gate type is N.
In DRFL pipeline, P gates must connect to N gates and vice versa to ensure the
correct precharge results.
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have the same parity.
To hold state, a pair of flip-flops is used to store the dual-rail outputs of its
fanin gate. So after evaluation mode, the flip-flops will store the pipeline output
data and provide the data for the next pipeline stage in next cycle. After precharge
mode, the pipeline outputs the flushed data to the flip flops, so the flip-flops store
the flushed data. In this case, the flip-flops alternate between precharge and eval-
uation modes as well, to ensure that they do not reveal a power signature.
In DRFL pipelines, evaluation data and precharge data propagate in an inter-
leaved manner, as shown in Fig. 4.4. During consecutive cycles, each pipeline stage
alternates between evaluation mode and precharge mode. For example, in cycle 1,
the combinational logic CL1 is in precharge mode, and CL2 is in evaluation mode;
in cycle 2, the CL1 is in evaluation mode and CL2 is in precharge mode, and so
on. During operation, each pipeline stage is always alternating between precharge
mode and evaluation mode. After propagation, the gates will consume the same
amount of energy no matter what the logic value is.
4.3 Intrinsic Resistance to DPA Attacks
The AES core is intrinsically resistant to DPA attacks thanks to a number of key
properties of DRFL gates and datapath architecture. First, due to its dual-rail topol-
ogy, each DRFL gate consumes the same amount of energy during evaluation and
precharge, regardless of the logic value it evaluates to. Second, since state is stored
using a pair of flip-flops per state bit, the power profile is not correlated to the
number of 1s or 0s in the state, therefore the flip-flops consume one unit of energy
no matter what the logic transition it goes through. Third, since during each cy-
cle, half of the datapath is in evaluation mode with the remainder of the datapath
in precharge mode, power profiles from evaluation and precharging are not read-
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Figure 4.4: Pipeline of DRFL gates, and interleaving of precharge and evaluation
mode.
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ily separable, yielding switching-independent energy consumption and increasing
resistance to DPA attacks.
DRFL has three key advantages over WDDL, another intrinsically DPA-resistant
logic family [3], which is shown in Fig. 2.13. First, WDDL gates are not static
dual-rail gates. Instead they use a pair of single-rail gates and a pair of following
inverters to mimic the circuits behavior of the static dual-rail gate. Apparently,
this results in large area overhead (4x compared to its CMOS counterpart), and the
performance is further degraded (50% performance degradation of CMOS coun-
terpart) because of the inverters delay overhead. On top of that, the energy con-
sumption is much larger (6x compared to its CMOS counterpart) since it uses two
CMOS gates to mimic one dual-rail gate and there is inverters energy overhead. In
addition, the WDDL gate does not take advantage of the dual-rail inputs to reduce
the transistors count in the chip.
The introduction of an inverter-pair at each WDDL gate is required to ensure
correct pipeline operation, although the WDDL adopts the same pipeline flush
technique as DRFL. The reason is that when flushing the pipeline, the gate has to
keep propagating the correct signal for each gate to reach a steady precharge state.
Therefore, with unbalanced datapath, WDDL must force every gate to precharge
to all 0 outputs, so that the 0s can propagate to flush all the gates along the way. As
described before, DRFL utilizes the parity of each gate, and denote gates as P/N
gate to regulate the connection, so that P gates only connect to N gates, and N gates
only connect to P gates (buffers will be inserted if parity is not met). In this case,
the pipeline can still be flushed correctly without paying the penalty of inverter
pairs at each gate.
To summarize, DRFL uses static dual-rail gates instead of pairs of single-rail
gates followed by inverters, resulting in low area overhead. DRFL uses a different
pipeline flush scheme that eliminates the inverter overhead of WDDL gates, thus
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Figure 4.5: Die photo, including both CMOS AES core and DRFL AES core, and
peripheral testing circuitry.
further reducing area and energy consumption. DRFL pipeline stages interleave
evaluation and precharging stages, yielding superior DPA resistance.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
4.4.1 DPA Measurement Results
The DPA-resistant AES core has been fabricated in a 65nm CMOS process. Its
standard CMOS counterpart has been included on the same die. The two cores
have the same RTL specification from [52], architecture, and target frequency. Die
photo is shown in Fig. 4.5.
DPA attacks are performed on both cores at nominal voltage level, because the
nominal voltage is the weakest operating voltage for DPA attacks. Explained in
[53], as energy consumption decreases with voltage scaling, the energy consump-
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Figure 4.6: Result of DPA attack on standard CMOS AES. The Graphs show corre-
lation values of all candidate keys vs. number of measurements. After about 768
measurements, the correlation value of the correct key candidate exceeds all other
incorrect key candidates, and continues to increase with the number of measure-
ments.
tion of each gate along with the chips overall power consumption is lower, yield-
ing a smaller power profile. Electrical background noise still remains at the same
level. So, the power signature is more masked by noise, and therefore, it is harder
for DPA attacks to extract the power information leading to more traces required.
Fig. 4.6 shows the DPA attack graph on the standard CMOS core. The graph
shows Measurements to Disclosure (MTD) for the standard CMOS core. MTD of
a byte in the key is the number of measurements needed for the correlation of the
correct key value to surpass the correlation of all other 255 values [2].
The first key byte of the CMOS core is disclosed relatively soon, as its corre-
lation value crosses the maximum correlation value among all the other 255 key
candidates correlation values only after 768 measurements, and the correct key
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Figure 4.7: CMOS DPA attack measurements histogram. After 2048 measure-
ments, the correlation value of the correct key largely exceeds that of all incorrect
key candidates, resulting in key inference with high confidence.
candidate correlation value continues to increase with the number of measure-
ments. This illustrates that it is fairly easy to break a CMOS core with limited time
allowance.
Fig. 4.7 lists all the key candidates correlation values after 2048 measurements.
These results show that, after a fairly small number of measurements, correlation
value of the correct key candidate is much larger than all other incorrect key can-
didates, exposing the correct key candidate with small amount of measurements.
Because the correct key correlation value is exposed with large margin compared
with the incorrect keys, it is highly likely that the DPA attack has exposed the key.
Fig. 4.8 shows the result of DPA attacks curve on the DRFL core. In this graph,
the correct key candidate correlation value remains below all other incorrect key
candidates correlation values even after 2 million measurements. As the number of
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Figure 4.8: Result of DPA attacks on DRFL AES core. Even after 2 million attacks,
the correlation value of the correct key candidate in DRFL core is still indistin-
guishable from all other key candidates. Increasing the number of measurements
does not affect the results. In this case, the DRFL core remains unbreakable even
after 2 million measurements, with no indication of imminent disclosure.
measurements increases, the correlation value of the correct key candidate remains
flat. Therefore, the attacker cannot infer the key at all. In fact, because the correct
key correlation value remains below that of incorrect key, if the attackers select
the keys associated with some of the highest correlation values, they will infer the
incorrect key value.
Nowadays security devices will switch keys every couple of minutes. So, if
an attacker cannot collect enough data to perform a successful DPA attack with
a limited amount of time, the new key will be switched into the devices, and the
attacker will need to launch a new attack.
Fig. 4.9 also illustrates the hardness of disclosing the key in the DRFL core.
Even after 2 million measurements, the correct key candidate correlation value is
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Figure 4.9: Histogram of DPA attack on DRFL AES core. Even after 2 million
attacks, the correlation value of correct key candidate is still indistinguishable.
still indistinguishable among all the other key candidates correlation values.
Our measurements show that the DRFL core provides greater resistance to DPA
attacks than its CMOS counterpart. CMOS design is easily cracked only after 768
measurements, and by having 2048 measurements, we have very high confidence
to claim the correct key is distinguishable from all the other incorrect key candi-
dates. On the other hand, even after 2 million measurements, the DRFL core still
remains unbreakable, and the correlation value graph shows no trend that the core
will be broken soon. We therefore expect the DRFL core to exhibit even higher
levels of DPA resistance than the 2604 factor that is derived in our DPA attack
experiments.
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Figure 4.10: Measured frequency vs. supply voltage. As the supply voltage de-
creases, the maximum frequency of the chip decreases as well.
4.4.2 Electrical Measurement Results
Due to its CMOS underpinnings, the DRFL core functions correctly across a wide
voltage range, as shown in Fig. 4.10. At nominal voltage 1V, both cores attain a
maximum clock frequency of 430MHz. As the supply voltage decreases, the max-
imum clock frequency decreases as well. When the core’s supply voltage reaches
the near-threshold level , the core’s speed dramatically declines, and at 0.4V, the
maximum clock frequency is only 10MHz.
The most significant difference between DRFL and all the other DPA-resistant
designs is its ability to operate with scaled supply voltage. All the current extrinsic
solutions either based on scrambling the power supply or inject noise to power
supply to mess up the power signature, resulting in unstable power supply voltage
and preventing the core from operating at near-threshold voltage levels. On the
other hand, all the intrinsic solutions either introduce large overhead, or are based
on dynamic logic and simply cannot be voltage scaled.
Fig. 4.11 shows the energy efficiency vs. supply voltage level. At the nominal
supply of 1V, the DRFL core consumes 7.09pJ/bit. With a near-threshold supply
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Figure 4.11: Measured energy consumption vs. supply voltage. As supply voltage
decreases, the energy consumption of the core decrease as well.
of 0.4V, the core operates consumes 1.25pJ/bit, marking the most energy-efficient
full-datapath AES core published to date.
Measurement results from the two cores are shown in Table 4.1. In terms of op-
erating frequency, both cores attain a maximum clock frequency of 430MHz at the
nominal 1V supply level, yielding 2.752Gbps throughput. The DRFL core achieves
half the throughput of its CMOS counterpart, since its pipelines are in precharge
mode every other cycle. When operating at near-threshold voltage 0.4V, the core
still runs at a clock frequency of 10MHz, yielding 64Mbps throughput.
In terms of area, the DRFL core is 50% larger than the CMOS core, due to the
overheads of dual-rail logic and balancing buffers. Counter-intuitively, despite the
dual-rail nature of DRFL gates, the DRFL core takes less than 2x area of CMOS core,
since it is using dual-rail gates. Because the dual-rail inputs advantage, some logic
gates like XOR do not cost double the transistors for a gate, and in some cases, due
to the complementary outputs of a dual-rail gate, some logic can be implemented
with fewer gates. Therefore, despite the dual-rail gate’s bigger size and balancing
buffers overhead, the DRFL core’s 0.048mm2 is only 50% larger than the CMOS
core’s 0.032mm2.
83
Table 4.1: DRFL and CMOS design characteristics
DRFL CMOS
Technology 65nm
Area
(mm2) 0.048 0.032
Supply
Voltage(V)
Nominal Threshold Nominal Threshold
1.0 0.4 1.0 0.4
Frequency
(MHz)
Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum
430 10 430 10
Throughput
(Gb/s) 2.752 0.064 5.504 0.128
Power(mW) 19.5 0.080 11.8 0.056
Energy Efficiency
(pJ/b) 7.09 1.25 2.14 0.44
Measurements to disclosure
(MTD) of 1st key byte 2× 10
6 768
Key bytes to disclosed
(out of 16 keys bytes) 0 16
DPA resistance 2604×
In terms of energy efficiency, when operating at nominal voltage 1V, the CMOS
core consumes 2.14pJ per bit and the DRFL core consumes 7.09pJ per bit, 3.3x of its
CMOS counterpart. The energy efficiency overhead can be explained from switch-
ing activity perspective. To achieve switching independent energy dissipation,
each gate must consume one unit of energy no matter what the logic transition
is. So that the switching activity is 100%, that is the reason why DRFL’s energy
overhead is much larger than its area overhead.
When operating at near-threshold 0.4V, the CMOS core consumes 0.44pJ per
bit, and DRFL core consumes 1.25pJ per bit with 2.8x of its CMOS counterpart.
The energy consumption ”overheads” become smaller as leakage power starts to
play a bigger role when moving to near-threshold voltage reason. Although the
dynamic power of DRFL is much larger than CMOS, its leakage power is similar
to CMOS core, and as the leakage ratio increases when moving to near-threshold
region, the energy consumption overheads of DRFL core decrease.
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Finally, in terms of resistance to DPA attacks, the DRFL core is not breakable
until 2 million measurements, yet the CMOS core is easily cracked after 768 mea-
surements. So, the DRFL core exhibits at least 2604x higher DPA resistance than
the CMOS core.
Table 4.2 compares the area, performance, energy efficiency, and DPA resistance
of the DRFL core and other published AES cores [2][3][30][37][49]. The designs
in [2][3][30][37] are DPA resistant with MTD of 1st key byte ranging from 66x to
2500x compared to an unprotected AES core. The design in [49] achieves superior
throughput and energy efficiency, but is not DPA resistant. Consuming 1.25pJ/bit,
the 0.048mm2 DRFL core is the smallest, most energy-efficient, and most DPA-
resistant design among the DPA-protected cores.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This dissertation explores logic architectures for designing secure chips that can re-
sist DPA attacks. DPA resistant AES cores are designed for both high throughput
application domain and low-cost, low-power IoT application domain. The pro-
posed solutions focus on the gate level, targeting switching independent energy
dissipation of each gate.
A 128-bit AES core running at 1.32GHz with intrinsic DPA resistance was pre-
sented. A new charge-recovery logic, called Bridge Boost Logic (BBL), was pro-
posed for the design of this AES core to ensure a switching-independent power
profile that is intrinsically immune to DPA attacks and provides power savings at
a GHz speed. The AES core designed based BBL is the fastest among published
DPA-resistant chips. Unlike previous approaches toward DPA resistance that incur
power overhead or speed degradation, this DPA-resistant AES core reduces power
consumption over its conventional static CMOS counterpart and maintains a high
throughput. Running at 16.90Gbps with 98mW, this core is 720x more DPA resis-
tant, and consumes 30% lower power than its static CMOS counterpart operating
at the same clock speed.
For low end applications, a voltage-scalable full-datapath 128-bit AES chip was
designed and fabricated based on proposed DRFL logic architecture. It is intrinsic
DPA resistance that is suitable for Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications thanks to
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its voltage scalability, energy-efficient operation, and small die area. Compared
to previous DPA-protected cores, this chip design is the smallest, most energy-
efficient, and most DPA-resistant.
An important question that remains open is the design of charge-recovery DPA-
resistant designs that incur minimal or no area overheads. To that end, it would
be interesting to explore the effectiveness of BBL-like architectures with only pull-
down evaluation networks. Another important question that remains open is the
design of DRFL-like architectures that do not incur the throughput overhead asso-
ciated with pipeline flushing.
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